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Linda E. Fisher t
Recently, in the wake of the tragic cycle of school shootings, national at-
tention has focused on the issue of gun control and whether government should
enforce further restrictions on gun ownership and use.' Almost contemporane-
ously, shooting victims and municipalities have filed lawsuits against gun
manufacturers and distributors. The lawsuits charge the defendants with negli-
gently marketing firearms to unscrupulous dealers with awareness that the guns
likely will make their way into the hands of criminals. 2 One such lawsuit,
brought by family members of shooting victims, recently resulted in a four-
million-dollar verdict against several of the defendant gun manufacturers. 3 Li-
ability was premised upon the manufacturers' failure to carry out
their duty to protect the public from the sale of firearms to criminals.
The municipalities' lawsuits have been modeled in part upon the prior law-
suits brought by the states against cigarette companies. Those lawsuits resulted
in a collective settlement of $246 billion and an agreement to finance programs
and research to discourage smoking and to impose restrictions on tobacco ad-
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1. See, e.g., Albert R. Hunt, A Discerning Population Isn't Looking to Extremes, WALL ST. J., June
24, 1999, at A9; Michael Janofsky, Many G.O.P. Governors Now Pushing for Greater Gun Control,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1999, at A7; Special Report, Guns in America, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 23, 1999, at 20.
2. See infra notes 132, 137-139, 149-157 and accompanying text.
3. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 811 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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vertising and marketing, including banning billboards and the cartoon figure
Joe Camel. 4 Those suits sought to recover money paid by state Medicaid pro-
grams to victims of smoking-related illnesses. The complaints in these cases
charged the defendant manufacturers with misrepresentation and with negli-
gent marketing of cigarettes despite knowledge of their danger. 5 Similarly, the
municipalities in the gun suits seek, inter alia, to recover costs incurred in
treating gunshot victims and in providing police services.
6
In both the cigarette and the gun suits, the plaintiffs have emphasized the
public interest in addressing the social consequences of private behavior likely
to cause harm.7 Although makers and purveyors of these products do not di-
rectly cause the complained-of harm, the suits attribute legal responsibility to
them under the theory that defendants aware of the potential-and often
likely-consequences of their actions cannot disclaim responsibility for those
untoward consequences when they occur. In each case, a third party's con-
scious decision to smoke or to fire a gun has intervened and directly caused
injury; the plaintiffs allege that the foreseeability of that injury should not cut
off proximate causation and absolve the defendants of legal responsibility.
8
Alcohol-related driving injuries and fatalities also raise these issues. Al-
though an individual guest makes her own choice to drink and drive, may so-
cial hosts still be liable for resulting accidents when they knowingly serve al-
cohol to the guest? In most states, Dram Shop acts have answered the question
affirmatively with respect to commercial establishments, but ordinarily private
social hosts are not liable. However, certain states, beginning with New Jersey
in 1984, have imposed liability on private individual hosts who serve liquor to
guests and then allow the guests to drive drunk, causing accidents and injury to
plaintiffs. 9 These decisions rely on the rationale that the public good is served
by imposing liability on those in the best position to prevent harm and by cre-
ating incentives to spread responsibility for harm. This rationale applies
equally well to the tobacco and firearms cases.
This Review will employ the current firearms lawsuits, the states' tobacco
litigation, and a New Jersey Supreme Court decision imposing social host li-
4. See, e.g., Barry Meier & David Johnston, How Inquiry into Tobacco Lost Its Steam, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1999, at A1 ("In the last two years, the nation's biggest tobacco companies have agreed to pay
$246 billion over 25 years to settle lawsuits filed by states .. "); Saundra Torry & John Schwartz, Big
Tobacco, State Officials Reach $206 Billion Deal, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1998, at Al; Saundra Tony &
John Schwartz, States Approve $206 Billion Deal with Big Tobacco, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1998, at A 1;
Big Tobacco Strikes Deal with States, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1998, at A20. The Justice Department has
filed a similar lawsuit. See David S. Cloud et al., Justice Reverses: Lobbying Effort Wins Turnabout on
Tobacco Suit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1999, at B 1.
5. See, e.g., New York v. Philip Morris, 686 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
6. See infra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 122-123, 145-146 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 80-82, 99 and accompanying text.
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ability in drunk driving cases as case studies of the importance of emphasizing
the public interest or common good in legal policy issues that traditionally
have been thought to concern individual rights or freedoms. In order to account
properly for both collective and individual interests, each must be weighed
against the other in rendering policy determinations. This Review adopts the
model of balancing employed in Amitai Etzioni's two most recent books, The
New Golden Rulel° and The Limits of Privacy.1 Etzioni's treatment of the
theme of balancing individual autonomy against the common good, as devel-
oped in those works, thus frames this Review.
I. COMMUNITARIANISM AND THE LAW
Etzioni is a prominent leader of the responsive communitarian movement
in the United States.' 2 The movement seeks social change in the form of a
"communitarian corrective" that would pull society back from the extreme in-
dividualism that Etzioni alleges currently permeates American culture, while
simultaneously respecting individual rights and subgroup autonomy:
"Responsive communitarians seek to balance individual rights with social re-
sponsibilities, and individuality with community."'
' 3
Etzioni's major premise is correct, and his balancing scheme can provide
powerful insight into the nature, causes, and cures of many of America's cur-
rent social problems. Other aspects of his theories, however, fail fully to de-
scribe the problems or accurately to prescribe appropriate antidotes. Most no-
tably, Etzioni's theory fails to take sufficient account of the constructive role of
law in a communitarian polity. In particular, Etzioni's excessive wariness
about the coercive aspect of law blinds him to the central role that the law can
and should play in resolving issues that are not amenable to resolution by
moral dialogue. The case studies of the alcohol, tobacco, and firearms show
that the law can be a constructive catalyst, fueling social processes that work
with it concurrently to effectuate change. While Etzioni acknowledges that law
has an appropriate, albeit minor, role in social change, he assigns it a role sub-
sidiary to that of civil society. 14 He also criticizes the prominent role that
courts, law, and law enforcement currently play in American society.
15
10. AMITAI ETzlONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RuLE (1996) (hereinafter NEW GOLDEN RULE); see also
Timothy L. Fort, The First Man and the Company Man: The Common Good, Transcendence, and Medi-
ating Institutions, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 391 (1999) (book review).
11. AMITAI ETzOm, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999) (hereinafter LIMITS OF PRIVACY). See also
Beverly Woodward, The Limits of Privacy, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 194 (1999) (book review).
12. See David B. Kopel & Christopher C. Little, Communitarians, Neorepublicans, and Guns: As-
sessing the Case for Firearms Prohibition, 56 MD. L. REV. 438, 441-45 (1997) (summarizing tenets of
the movement).
13. LIMITS OF PRIVACY, supra note 11, at 198.
14. See NEW GOLDEN RULE, supra note 10, at 140-49.
15. See id. at 138-40.
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Etzioni's premise in The New Golden Rule, the earlier of the two works, is
that a communitarian society flourishes when the inevitable tension between
social responsibility and individual autonomy is maintained in suitable equilib-
rium. The "New Golden Rule"-" [r]espect and uphold society's moral order as
you would have society respect and uphold your autonomy"16-is his general
formulation of the proper relationship between these two values. As expressed,
the rule is a maxim an individual can use as a guideline to appropriate behav-
ior. Because the rule is very broadly phrased, however, further culturally
shared principles are needed to guide its application to particular situations, es-
pecially when the values of order and autonomy clash. Those values clash most
acutely in diverse, pluralistic societies. Etzioni sets forth a number of core val-
ues shared by Americans, such as a commitment to democracy and the Con-
stitution, 17 but those values are often too general and abstract to support actual
resolutions of contentious issues. Moreover, power disparities between groups
exacerbate the negative consequences of unresolved values conflicts. This Re-
view will discuss some of the problems that can arise in such situations and
how law can perform the constructive function of defining issues and harmo-
nizing conflicting norms.
In The Limits of Privacy, his most recent book, Etzioni continues his at-
tempt to balance the norms of order and autonomy, but in application to spe-
cific issues conceming individual privacy rights, such as mandatory HIV test-
ing of infants.' 8 Etzioni sets forth four further criteria to guide policymakers
and decisionmakers in determining whether common interests in health and
safety justify the restriction of individual privacy interests. In the process, he
begins to rectify some of the vagueness of the New Golden Rule.' 9 These crite-
ria include: (1) limiting privacy only if a "well-documented and macroscopic
threat to the common good" exists, corresponding to a clear and present dan-
ger;2° (2) requiring a society to resort first to measures that will not restrict
autonomy; 21 (3) making privacy-limiting measures "minimally intrusive";
22
and (4) preferring those measures that account for "undesirable side effects"
over those that do not.23 The four criteria together stand for the proposition that
autonomy should be carefully safeguarded and limited as little as possible con-
sistent with the need to protect the public interest. Examined from another per-
16. Id. at xviii.
17. See id. at 199-210.
18. Other issues addressed include sex offender registration and notification laws, deciphering en-
crypted messages, I.D. cards and biometric identities, and dissemination of medical records.
19. Etzioni initially sets forth these criteria in The New Golden Rule, but his analysis in that work is
perfunctory. See id. at 52-55.
20. LIMITS OF PRIVACY, supra note 11, at 12.
21. See id.
22. Id. at 13.
23. See id
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spective, because autonomy is an important component of the common good, it
must be considered when calculating an optimal societal balance. The criteria
provide factors to guide the balancing of interests, but they provide no content
to the order and autonomy interests that are weighed. Nor do they specify any
means of arriving at that balance.
The New Golden Rule is addressed to individuals. A corollary to Etzioni's
theory is that, in a democracy, the converse of the Rule should also hold, ap-
plied to society: a society should respect and uphold citizens' autonomy as it
would have citizens respect and uphold its moral order. From this perspective,
the corollary of the Rule obviously cannot literally operate as a moral admoni-
tion to guide voluntary behavior because society does not operate as a volun-
tary moral agent. Rather, the corollary should apply as a general standard to
assess legislation, regulations, and judicial decisions to avoid an overweening
social order. The four criteria of The Limits of Privacy begin to apply this cor-
ollary of the New Golden Rule to concrete social issues.
To apply the New Golden Rule on a societal basis, Etzioni urges individu-
als to engage in broad-scale moral dialogues, which he terms "megalogues," to
24promote positive social change. He insists that the promise of the Rule can
only be achieved on a voluntary basis and that law cannot effectively coerce
compliance to promote a communitarian society.25 The Limits of Privacy ech-
oes this assertion. Inevitably, though, any application of values to concrete be-
havior will implicate both political and legal considerations. Therefore, the
Rule should address collective behavior on these dimensions as well, and in
doing so, it must address the role of law.
This Review will challenge Etzioni's explanation of the limited role of law
and will argue for a broader role for law in promoting effective communitarian
change in the United States. Although Etzioni occasionally concedes the useful
26function of law in accelerating change, more often he criticizes the current
American reliance on courts and lawyers to induce change. He has failed to
recognize that while societal change occurs primarily on political and social
levels, the law can affirmatively assist collective efforts to change public be-
havior. It can also help imbue individuals with a greater sense of responsibility
for others harmed by dangerous but legal products. Its persuasive and even its
coercive powers are sometimes necessary to overcome societal inertia or
gridlock and to accomplish a suitable communitarian objective. Legal deci-
sions can be more than rearguard actions to concretize existing norms or a
weapon in an arsenal of public policy education tools; they can constructively
help society reconcile clashing norms and policies and point the way to further
avenues of change. The courts can engage in a balancing process that society is
24. See NEW GOLDEN RULE, supra note 10, at 106.
25. See id. at 138-48.
26. See, e.g., id. at 107 (discussing the Karen Quinlan case and the Scopes trial).
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unwilling or unable to conduct.
Etzioni is overly sanguine about society's ability to arrive at consensus
through discussion. Modem societies are composed of a great number of
groups with incommensurate interests and values. Because megalogues alone
cannot resolve clashes of incommensurate values, legal processes frequently
are necessary. In fact, courts are often institutionally better suited to resolve
dilemmas and to provide adequate protection for both individual rights and the
common good than is the culture at large, through megalogues or otherwise.
The legal system serves effectively as a societal decisionmaker in a way that
dialogue and consensus simply cannot. Insistence on consensus before change
can occur often simply reinforces the status quo, regardless of its morality. Et-
zioni's approach suffers from a majoritarian bias.
The premises of this Review differ with Etzioni's approach both empiri-
cally and theoretically. Empirically, it does not share Etzioni's belief that
Americans share sufficient core values. Theoretically, it acknowledges the po-
tential for law to play a more prominent role in resolving moral dilemmas that
cannot be adequately harmonized through dialogue alone. The Review con-
cludes that the involvement of American legal institutions can in many in-
stances be quite beneficial to the resolution of moral dilemmas with legal di-
mensions. The visibility and status of the courts can help not only to educate
the public about issues, but also to persuade it to accept resolutions of dilem-
mas that are otherwise hopelessly deadlocked. Indeed, courts themselves can
engage in a version of the "megalogues" that Etzioni urges to produce con-
structive change. By identifying and weighing the personal autonomy and
common good values underlying opposed legal positions, the courts can en-
gage in a dialectical process that encourages productive resolutions of policy
dilemmas.
II. ORDER, AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, AND PLURALISM
Etzioni's work focuses on and details many of this country's current prob-
lems stemming from our culture's overemphasis on individualism and con-
comitant lack of a vocabulary to discuss community. Framing the problem with
issues of order, autonomy, and community is a fitting way to begin devising a
discourse of American collective life. Etzioni's diagnosis in The New Golden
Rule is largely accurate but incomplete, failing to account fully for the prob-
lems arising from a pluralistic diversity of values and the necessarily coercive
role of law in resolving intractable values conflicts. The further elaboration of
these themes in The Limits of Privacy, while helpful, does not solve the basic
problem. Although Etzioni's four criteria give some indication of the relative
values to be accorded to order and (at least certain) autonomy interests, they
cannot fully resolve fundamental substantive conflicts. Nor do they specify
further means of achieving a suitable balance.
Vol. 18:351, 2000
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A. The Social Order, the Public Good, and Their Relationship to Autonomy
Although many Americans are instinctively repelled by the notion of a so-
cial order that can trump individual preference, and therefore may recoil at Et-
zioni's prioritization of social order in a communitarian democracy, order need
not be oppressive. Order can merely refer to the collective determination of ap-
propriate moral conduct and the preservation of public health and safety." The
same concept can be rephrased as "the public interest." A decent community
must, of course, promote the well-being of its individual members. A primary
method for a society to do so is to establish standards of appropriate behavior.
In a constitutional democracy, citizens may participate to define its content,
both politically and morally, with constraints produced by recognition of indi-
vidual rights, a commitment to constitutionalism, adherence to fair procedures,
and a fundamental respect for others' subcultural values. 28 Consequently, a so-
cial order may exist that adequately recognizes and protects individual rights,
particularly the rights of less powerful members of society. Therefore, as Etzi-
oni repeatedly emphasizes, protecting the social order need not threaten indi-
vidual rights that are necessary to encourage an optimal degree of individual
autonomy.
29
Further, the need for order may be reconceptualized not as the need of an
abstract, coercive entity-society--over and against the individual, but rather
as reflecting the individual's need for community (mutuality, connectedness,
and participation in a joint enterprise). So conceived, "order" gives appropriate
weight to social needs and recognition to the socially constructed aspects of
human identity, the ways in which our identities are determined by our rela-
tionships. 30 "Order" is an abstraction of some of those needs. From this per-
spective, order is necessary to sustain individual flourishing and is also essen-
tial to the public interest.
It is helpful to view the issue not only from the perspective of the individ-
ual, but also from a collective vantage point. That is, individuals are inevitably
part of many communities-national, ethnic, religious, and the like. Any com-
plete picture of human life must capture the individual embedded within those
larger structures, since no one can live in complete isolation. Thus recast, the
issue becomes not whether we as individuals desire communal life, or whether
27. See LIMITS OF PRIVACY, supra note 11, at 4.
28. See NEW GOLDEN RULE, supra note 10, at 199-2 10. Many of our core values are both moral
and political. The two interpenetrate on many levels.
29. See id. passim.
30. See id. at 25-26 (quoting CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 500-01 (1989), and
MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 179 (1982)). Etzioni draws not only on
political theory, but on developmental psychology as well, referring to studies demonstrating the effects
of isolation on people. See generally URIE BROFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
(1979); ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1963); JEAN PIAGET, THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION
OF THE WORLD (1929).
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we think it is good, but what sort of community or communities we want. How
can communities best ensure that they promote human flourishing and well-
being? The individual is no more fundamental or primary than the communities
in which she is embedded. Etzioni appropriately emphasizes the need to bal-
ance autonomy with concern for order.
A viable community entails reciprocity and mutually respectful interactions
between individuals and those institutions that embody the relevant moral or-
der. These relationships promote the flourishing and well-being of individual
members. Individuals flourish when they are able to exercise autonomy, or the
positive liberty that enables self-development. 31 Etzioni's formulation of the
optimal societal balance recognizes this need for autonomy. 32 Much of that in-
dividual development occurs only in relationship to others. In turn, the well-
being of individuals, premised in part on the exercise of their autonomy, pro-
motes the flourishing of the society as a whole.
33
31. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 131 (1969).
Berlin's distinction between positive and negative liberty assists in understanding the relationship be-
tween autonomy and order as formulated by Etzioni. Berlin defines negative liberty as that which pro-
hibits interference by others with one's actions. See id. at 122. Positive liberty, on the other hand, is the
power that promotes self-development and self-realization. See id. at 131. A proper balance of autonomy
and order would allow citizens the negative liberty to pursue their own inclinations up to the point of
harming others by interfering with both their negative and positive liberty. (Of course, positive liberty
includes much more than a noninterference guarantee.) To deter and punish such unacceptable conduct,
the social order must ensure sanctions against those who harm others.
32. See LIMITS OF PRIVACY, supra note 11, at 10; NEw GOLDEN RULE, supra note 10, at 23-28. In
its balancing of order and autonomy, Etzioni's general formulation of the New Golden Rule and his ap-
plication of the principles in The Limits of Privacy are generally harmonious with John Stuart Mill's
approach as set forth in his classic essay On Liberty. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in J.S. MILL ON
LIBERTY IN Focus (John Gray & G.W. Smith, eds., 1991). Although Mill is generally thought of as a
libertarian, his utilitarianism balances liberty with responsibility to promote the "permanent interests of
man as a progressive being." Id. at 31. At least insofar as an obligation to prevent harm is concerned,
Mill's and Etzioni's views accord. One is free to determine one's own actions only insofar as they do
not harm others, Mill argues, because "[a]ll that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the
enforcement of restraints upon the action of other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be im-
posed, by law ..." Id. at 26. Mill further articulates this harm principle as follows:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.... [T]he only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Id. at 30. Accordingly, one may not directly cause harm to another. Mill further interprets the principle
to justify an obligation requiring "joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys
the protection." Id. at 32. One may even be compelled "to perform certain acts of individual benefi-
cence, such as saving a fellow creature's life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage.
..." Id. The latter may be required because "[a] person may cause evil to others not only by his actions
but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury." Id.
In sum, Mill argues that others' well-being and interests must be protected in order that they may
fully exercise their own autonomy: "The means of development which the individual loses by being
prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the expense of
the development of other people." Id. at 79. The articulation and enforcement of these obligations is a
major function of the social order. The social order may not, however, interfere with one's private ac-
tions that cause no harm to others. Like Etzioni, Mill does not treat individual autonomy as primary. He
recognizes a duty to rescue because the relevant moral perspective is the individual within society.
33. See generally ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY (1977); ROBERT SEARS, ET AL.,
IDENTIFICATION AND CHILD REARING (1965).
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Etzioni refers to this reciprocal relationship as "inverting symbiosis." 34
Both autonomy and order enhance each other to a degree. Optimally, they in-
teract symbiotically to promote the overall social good. Etzioni's point in The
New Golden Rule is that this constructive balance has been broken in recent
years by an overemphasis on individualism, so that a "communitarian correc-
tive" is now needed. As Etzioni points out, American collective life has suf-
fered in recent decades, probably because of the preeminence of libertarian no-
tions of maximum individual autonomy and the centrality of the market in
economic and political life. 5 When social and cultural bonds are weakened,
individuals' willingness to assume duties to others tends to weaken as well.
One consequence is increasing anomie and alienation from others.
A superficially counterintuitive result of this alienation is a net reduction of
individual liberty. To the extent that social and cultural bonds forge individual
identity and promote well-being and self-realization, the lack of collective
bonds will diminish the autonomy they nurture. That is, liberty and autonomy
suffer when individuals avoid taking responsibility sufficient to maintain the
social order.36 The disintegration of community thus reduces the quality of
life. History demonstrates, however, that social order easily can become domi-
nant and oppressive as well; hence the need for a balance that fits current cir-
cumstances and that respects autonomy.
Following these principles, the opposition between autonomy and order is
not as dualistic as initially posed. As Etzioni recognizes, the relationship be-
tween the two is much more complex, mediated by cultural norms that are pro-
duced in significant part by intermediate institutions such as families, neigh-
borhoods, ethnic and religious affiliations, workplaces, and the institution of
law.37 Any achievable balance between order and autonomy is dependent upon
and must be worked out initially in intermediate communities between individ-
ual members. Thus, as Etzioni emphasizes, that balance is easiest to maintain
when individuals voluntarily assume responsibilities that help ensure social co-
hesion or, in other words, when "autonomy [is] fully respectful of order."38
According to this model, megalogues provide the optimal process for resolving
clashes of values.
34. NEw GOLDEN RULE, supra note 10, at 36.
35. See id. at xv.
36. For instance, in a highly publicized incident occurring a couple of years ago, a student refused
to intervene to prevent his college student friend from killing a seven-year-old girl in a Las Vegas
restroom and failed to report the crime afterwards. See Don Terry, Mother Rages Against Indifference,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 24, 1998, at AI0.
37. Lately, legal scholars have begun to realize the importance of norms in understanding how law
works in society. See generally Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
947 (1997); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
38. NEw GOLDEN RULE, supra note 10, at 18.
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B. The Balancing Process: Achieving the Symbiosis of Order and Autonomy
In The New Golden Rule, Etzioni does not specify precisely how a society
should conduct the megalogues that theoretically yield an appropriate balance
of order and autonomy. Rather, he attempts to capture the essence of these
large-scale moral dialogues by examining certain salient features. Their central
defining feature may be the good faith attempt of participants to search for,
listen to, and heed the "moral voice" that encourages adherence to deeply held
values. 39 Moral dialogues, as distinguished from rational deliberations, rely on
an appeal to overarching shared values to reach agreement on more discrete
normative issues.4 °
Etzioni similarly does not endorse defined procedures for megalogues, but
instead sketches out certain desirable general rules. These include not demon-
izing other participants and not affronting the "deepest moral commitments of
the other groups. 4 1 Further rules include emphasizing needs and interests
rather than rights and leaving certain irresolvable issues out of the dialogue.42
These moral dialogues become megalogues when they are expanded to ever-
larger concentric circles of communities. Megalogues can take place on a na-
tional, or even international, level.4 3
The megalogue notion apparently is partially inspired by Martin Buber's
conception of the I-Thou relationship. 44 True dialogue can enlighten partici-
pants, allowing them to reach a joint result transcending the original insights of
participating individuals. Presumably, the megalogue process encourages mu-
tual accommodations according with shared values. In a process like osmosis,
harm and benefit flow through and between individuals in the social matrix.
While The New Golden Rule provides a number of examples indicating a
substantive balance of order and autonomy that Etzioni considers appropriate
in certain situations, it does not elaborate standards to judge the appropriate-
ness of a particular balance. The Limits of Privacy is more successful than The
New Golden Rule in reaching concrete solutions to particular problems. Etzioni
applies his principles to issues ranging from mandatory HIV testing of infants
to deciphering encrypted messages. But once again, while the principles supply
general guidance, they do not substantially assist in assigning agreed-upon as-
certainable values to the various interests involved.
For example, Etzioni analyzes the issue of mandatory infant HIV testing
39. See id. at 120-26.
40. See id. at 85-104.
41. Id. at 104.
42. See id. at 105.
43. See id. at 106-10.
44. See Edward W. Lehman, From Compliance to Community in the Works of Amitai Etzioni, 9
THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 38, 43 (1999); William R. Lund, Taking Autonomy Seriously: Some Lib-
eral Doubts About The New Golden Rule, 9 THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 10, 19 (1999).
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using his four factors: limiting privacy only in the face of great danger; resort-
ing first to measures that do not restrict autonomy; using only minimally intru-
sive measures; and treating undesirable side effects. 45 He concludes with re-
spect to the first factor that while privacy is compromised, in that the infant's
HIV status will reveal the mother's, the danger of not making tests mandatory
is quite substantial, given the risk of undetected infection. Factor two requires
consideration of alternatives such as voluntary testing of pregnant women. Et-
zioni reasons that the safeguard of infant testing is required in addition to vol-
46
untary testing to assure that no HIV-positive cases are missed. This measure,
as the only conclusive test, is therefore the least intrusive. Finally, Etzioni pro-
poses safeguards such as the use of PIN numbers and audits to minimize the
dangers of unwarranted access to a particular mother's and child's HIV
status.4 7 Etzioni thus concludes that the optimal balance of privacy (autonomy)
and the public good (social order) lies in imposing a program of mandatory in-
fant testing.
Concrete illustrations of this nature, which apply the balancing factors to
actual public policy issues, help flesh out Etzioni's notion of the proper sub-
stantive balance, but many issues remain. For instance, Etzioni does not link
the megalogue notion of The New Golden Rule to the particular balances he
endorses in The Limits of Privacy, leaving the reader to wonder whether an
actual megalogue on one of these issues might lead to a less desirable balance
or to no balance at all. In addition, who is to judge when a particular result ren-
ders a correct balance? Who is to ensure that accurate empirical information is
obtained and that the appropriate process is followed in a genuine moral debate
on a particular issue? Indeed, there is no assurance whatsoever that a result
better, or even different, than the status quo will obtain.
C. Critique of Etzioni 's View
Notwithstanding the obvious appeal of the voluntary consensus model, it is
not a workable solution to the problems of pluralism. First, this model of vol-
untariness necessarily assumes that basic needs of members are met. People
lacking necessities or struggling to maintain a minimally acceptable standard
of living generally cannot afford the luxury of looking beyond their immediate
survival. It also assumes that basic agreement on a set of core social values can
be attained. Without a common reference point, no arbiter of disputes exists to
harmonize or mediate disagreements. When they exist, core values can operate
as a meta-standard, providing an agreed-upon substantive and procedural frame
of reference that can be applied to more discrete dilemmas on a lower order of
45. See LIMITS OF PRIVACY, supra note 11, at 17-42.
46. See id. at 24-40.
47. See id. at 41-42.
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specificity. According to Etzioni, Americans do share a number of basic val-
ues, such as a substantive belief in democracy 48 and a commitment to the Con-
stitution, including its protection of rights and its structuring of decisionmaking
power.49 The question remains, however, whether these values are in them-
selves sufficiently thick to promote mediation of moral conflict.
Absent both of these conditions-that basic needs are met and that suffi-
cient shared values exist-fruitful moral dialogues are unlikely to occur on
more than a small scale. The more pluralistic the society, the larger the area of
disagreement on values and, thus, the greater the tension between values. In-
deed, after a certain point, disparate values become incommensurable. Lacking
significant common ground, participants have difficulty sustaining meaningful
conversations that reach accord, whether they converse as individuals or as
members of intermediate communities. In the United States in particular, ten-
sion between important values tends to be expressed in the polarity between
autonomy and social responsibility for the common good. Although there are
disagreements about the definition or scope of autonomy rights and social re-
sponsibilities, the major fault line lies between individual freedom and obliga-
tions to others or to society. 50 Even if there were general adherence to the prin-
ciple that personal freedom cannot extend to the point of harming others,
endless moral, political, and empirical disagreements would erupt concerning
the nature and definition of the harm that one may not cause others. 51
Gun control provides a good example. Many Americans believe that guns
should be much more heavily regulated than is currently the case because of
the immense harm they can cause both to individuals and to society. Others
believe, equally strongly, that impinging on the individual right to bear arms
causes immense harm. A shared commitment to democracy, fair procedures,
and constitutionalism has not sufficed, and probably cannot suffice, to resolve
the standoff. Etzioni elides this issue when he concludes that, because most
Americans favor gun control, legislation should be enacted. 52 He fails to ac-
48. See NEW GOLDEN RULE, supra note 10, at 199-200.
49. See id. at 200-02.
50. See, e.g., Edward Rothstein, Dethroning Freedom as a Nation Builder, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2000, at F I (reviewing unpublished dissertation of James E. Block). Rothstein summarizes Block's view
as follows:
American history has always involved a tension between individual freedom and collective
demands. From the start, untethered liberty was seen as a danger; it was indulgent and poten-
tially disruptive. But servitude to an unquestioned authority was just as troubling. So icono-
clasm and conformity continually clash. The compromise is a notion of agency where freedom
freely serves a common cause.
Id. at FI.
51. See Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of the First Amendment, 113 HARV. L.
REv. 778, 796 (2000) (reviewing STEVEN H. SanRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF
AMERICA (1999)) ("In today's more diverse society, no single, simple definition of the common good is
attainable.").
52. See NEW GOLDEN RULE, supra note 10, at 146.
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count for the significant number of citizens who are adamantly opposed to at-
tempts to regulate firearms. It is this strong difference of opinion that fre-
quently makes court intervention helpful. Merely having a majority in favor of
a certain aim does not ensure the normative support that Etzioni believes nec-
essary to justify legislative measures. If the opposition, such as the National
Rifle Association, is well-funded and organized, it can stall legislation indefi-
nitely and foment continued normative opposition on many fronts. Etzioni's
apparent faith that Americans share sufficient values to adopt largely unitary
positions, and that this majority sentiment will prevail legally, is unfounded.
Recent American history does not support such faith.
Problems arise when applying Etzioni's framework to particular, intracta-
ble historical situations. On a descriptive or empirical level, participants may
define differently the nature of the particular dilemma, its origins, conse-
quences, and cures. On a normative level, participants often differ in their hier-
archy of relevant values and principles, notwithstanding agreement on a few
core values. Thus, members of society may well disagree on what compro-
mises are necessary to achieve an appropriate balance. In such cases, the New
Golden Rule is unhelpful.
The New Golden Rule may assume, or even require, more social homoge-
neity than currently exists. As applied to small-scale, discrete problems, it may
work as an ideal model to guide voluntary compliance with its principle, but it
is unlikely to effectuate large-scale compliance. The four criteria enumerated in
The Limits of Privacy for limiting encroachments on autonomy provide scant
assistance because the relevant values must still be precisely identified, priori-
tized, and weighed against each other. Each step in the process requires suffi-
cient agreement to reach an ultimate shared conclusion. Given the subjectivity
of the values involved, a shared conclusion is unlikely to be reached by any but
a small, homogeneous group.
Affirmative action, for instance, and race relations in general, seem to pose
irresolvable conflicts. Abortion provides another example. More shared sub-
stantive values, or at least more shared perceptions of the world, seem neces-
sary to reach agreed-upon resolutions. Although Etzioni correctly disputes
those individualists who believe that agreed-upon procedures and the applica-
tion of reason alone can resolve serious substantive disputes,53 his suggested
alternative suffers from similar defects. For instance, general agreement that
municipalities should democratically decide zoning questions does not mean
that residents will accept a group home for developmentally disabled adoles-
cents in a residential neighborhood.
Given these overwhelming difficulties, the question presented here is
whether the tension between autonomy and social responsibility realistically
53. See id. at 97-101.
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can be reduced or held in a more constructive balance in this society at this
time by following the New Golden Rule, with the assistance of the four limit-
ing principles of The Limits of Privacy. One should not conclude, however, that
the Rule is nothing but an aspirational ideal; rather, its promise is achievable
only on a modest scale. As Etzioni correctly points out, the determination of
appropriate balance is never final because of the complexity of the issues and
the diversity of values involved. The tension must instead be resolved in a
given situation, through a highly contextualized process; thus, the balance will
vary depending on the individual situation.
In fact, however, a national balance on virtually any truly contentious issue
is probably impossible to achieve, given the diversity and often incommen-
surability of people's values and interests. One must focus instead on specific
issues and smaller dilemmas to find feasible resolutions, using a pragmatic
contextualism. Any answer will be provisional, highly dependent on the nature
of a particular dilemma and the values conflict fueling it. An answer appropri-
ate this year may not be appropriate five years hence, or a solution may work
only on a regional or local level. Thus, while the tensions probably can be re-
duced to some extent, moral suasion is unlikely to lead to a fundamental or fi-
nal resolution of the basic tension between the values of order and autonomy as
applied to polarized issues. We can only grope towards tentative solutions to
narrowly framed problems.
III. THE ROLE OF LAW IN PROMOTING A PROPER BALANCE OF VALUES
What, then, is the role of law in defining and resolving the tension between
individual and community interests when moral dialogue alone does not suf-
fice? Can legal measures and discourse actually further the communitarian ob-
jective of achieving a livable equilibrium between the values of individual
freedom and the common good? Is the legal system too inherently coercive to
contribute to the voluntary acquiescence of individuals to the social order or to
bring about effective social change that honors individual autonomy?
Etzioni's articulation of the limited role of law in a communitarian society
assumes the primacy of preexisting moral commitments in bringing about ef-
fective social change or resolving particular dilemmas. It also implicitly as-
sumes stable moral institutions in which dialogues can occur, since dialogues
require a forum and rules of engagement. Etzioni argues that law should not
attempt to coerce commitment to a certain policy objective or course of action
that holds insufficient social support.54 He contends that law hinders positive
social development if it coerces individuals to act for the public good in a
manner that exceeds widely held normative commitments:
[Llaw in a good society is first and foremost the continuation of moral-
54. See id. at 139-40, 143-48.
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ity by other means. The law may sometimes lead to societal change to
some extent, but if the moral culture... does not closely follow, the
social order will not be voluntarily heeded and the society will be
pushed.., ultimately, beyond its limits of tolerance, transforming into
an authoritarian society. 5
He would agree that the law can advance communitarian goals if it reflects the
moral underpinnings of society, and if it "further express[es], articulate[s], and
help[s] enforce moral commitments, when those are in place." 56 Etzioni further
refers to "[t]he need to lead, accompany, and follow legislation with moral un-
derpinning" as the "values primacy sociological law. 57 In this limited role, law
can serve the function of reducing the tension between autonomy and the
common good by applying and enforcing existing moral resolutions of dilem-
mas to real-world situations. That is, law serves a social good when it rein-
forces existing norms of the culture.
58
At times, Etzioni's analysis of legal changes that precede changes in a ma-
jority's normative commitments seems to conflate the roles of legislatures,
courts, and police, blurring relevant distinctions among them.59 This conflation
occasionally confuses his analysis, leading to the apparent conclusion that
brute force underlies all law not reflecting a majority's strongly held values. 60
A more nuanced analysis would distinguish situations in which law enforce-
ment must continually compel compliance, such as that presented by Prohibi-
tion, from situations in which the law operates primarily persuasively, backed
up by its enforcement power. Employment discrimination laws provide a good
example of the latter category. Enactment of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act preceded widespread cultural opposition to many illegal forms of race and
sex discrimination in the workplace. Nonetheless, the law has been effective in
producing normative commitments that disapprove of such discrimination.
While many cultural forces have worked together to produce this change, it
seems intuitively evident that the law has played a prominent role.
Thus, while legal change admittedly cannot produce effective social change
when it significantly contravenes a majority's strongly held values, the law
should not for that reason be limited to a supporting role. In many ways, legal
institutions are better suited than the culture at large to resolve disputes based
on underlying moral dilemmas. Megalogues cannot guarantee closure because
the rules of engagement are not explicit, nor can any external authority ensure
that either rules or outcomes are observed. Moral dialogue can continue indefi-
55. Id. at 143 (emphasis omitted).
56. Id. at 145.
57. Id.
58. See id. ("As I see it, the main issue is not whether we legislate morality, but the distance be-
tween the values we affrmn as an inclusive community and those expressed in law.").
59. See id. at 138-39, 143, 146-48.
60. See, e.g., id at 140, 143.
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nitely with no assurance that any dialectical opposition will ever reach a syn-
thesis. Law, by contrast, can serve effectively as a cultural decisionmaker. The
legal system provides a forum for dispute resolution with relatively ascertain-
able rules, a relative degree of finality of outcomes, and a means of enforcing
its decisions. By identifying and harmonizing opposed values in a forum this
society normally recognizes as legitimate to resolve disputes, legal decisions
can validate the particular resolution achieved. That validation in turn performs
symbolic functions beyond the expressive. The American constitutional sys-
tem, with its protection of minority rights, also can often preserve rights of per-
61sonal freedom from an oppressive majority. Procedural rights can help ensure
that those substantive rights are vindicated and enforced. The civil rights
movement recognized this fact early and was thus able to use the courts effec-
tively both to protect the rights of movement activists and to advance the cause
of civil rights for blacks more generally.
62
The power of law to influence norms is magnified in American society be-
cause our culture is so highly legalized. Our current cultural discourse contains
many categories and values adapted from legal discourse. Indeed, this has been
a notable feature of American culture at least since the time of Tocqueville,
who observed:
Scarcely any question arises in the United States which does not be-
come, sooner or later, a subject of judicial debate; hence all parties are
obliged to borrow the ideas, and even the language usual in judicial
proceedings, in their daily controversies.... The language of the law
thus becomes, in some measure, a vulgar tongue; the spirit of the
law.., gradually penetrates ... into the bosom of society, where it de-
scends to the lowest classes, so that at last the whole people contract the
habits and the tastes of the judicial magistrate.63
Legal discourse is itself reciprocally affected by cultural norms and discourse.
It tends to crystallize and reflect larger social issues and tensions between con-
flicting norms. When legal discourse mixes with general discourse, legal cate-
gories and outcomes become part of public moral dialogue insofar as they filter
back into the general culture. 64 Pervasive media coverage of prominent trials
and hearings and passage of new and controversial legislation enhance this ef-
fect. Because of this interdependent relationship, American legal processes are
even more likely to contain and reflect cultural paradoxes and incongruities
61. See generally Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 n.16 (1983); United States v. Caro-
lene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
62. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 148-65 (1991); Eric K. Ya-
mamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practices in Post-Civil Rights
America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 821, 844-45 (1997); see generally DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND
AMERICAN LAW (3d ed., 1992); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).
63. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley, ed., 1945).
64. See Michael Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration, in NEW COMMUNITARIAN
THINKING 87 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995); Charles Taylor, Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere, in id.
at 212.
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than legal processes in general. The heightened status of American law in-
creases the likelihood of resolving these tensions in part because the receive
public attention and provide categories and procedural mechanisms to decide
disputes. American legal decisions can therefore alter public discourse and in-
fluence normative development. While Etzioni likely would agree generally
with this assertion, he would not conclude that legal changes should play an
active role in efforts to effect cultural change.
The coercive aspect of law can also augment its persuasiveness by adding
the imprimatur of the state to legal mandates. Etzioni acknowledges that indi-
viduals' moral assessments of events can be influenced by knowledge of the
law's mandates. 65 Particularly when disseminated by the media, legal decisions
can educate the public. In the current cultural climate of uncertainty about the
reconciliation of competing values, this educational function may be especially
valuable.66 Thus, American law effects social change by infiltrating cultural
discourse and by conferring the heightened status of judicial decisions on an
outcome. The law cannot by itself accomplish massive cultural or social
change, but it can act to prime the cultural pump and act in tandem with other
cultural forces to further incremental change. Its role is consequently integral,
rather than merely auxiliary, to cultural discourse.
For example, the early sexual harassment litigation in the 1980s paved the
way for current sensitivity to the issue. Once courts recognized sexual harass-
ment as legally actionable, decisions in favor of victims came down.6 7 Gradu-
ally, the culture began to acknowledge the reality of sexual harassment, the
culpability of its perpetrators, and the right of its targets to a remedy. Similar
arguments can be made about domestic violence and the self-defense rights of
battered women.68 In both these instances, the courts' realization that law must
recognize and redress the injuries suffered by victims of harassment and vio-
lence led the way to greater public awareness and political action. Conse-
quently, the general culture, legislatures, and courts provide redress for these
injuries that would have been unthinkable several decades ago. Individual
65. See NEW GOLDEN RULE, supra note 10, at 145.
66. At other times, when insufficient normative support exists, coercion undermines constructive
resolution of disputes by instilling resentment, a point Etzioni relies on to urge an ancillary role for law.
See id. at 148.
67. Catharine MacKinnon made an early and persuasive case for the viability of sexual harassment
claims under Title VII. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). Before that time, only a few courts had found sexual harassment
actionable. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Williams v. Saxbe, 413
F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976). In 1980, the EEOC issued guidelines specifying that sexual harassment is a
form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII, and the Supreme Court ruled in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), that hostile environment sexual harassment claims are actionable
under Title VII. Since that time, of course, the culture has widely accepted that sexual harassment is
wrong and should be prohibited.
68. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETr, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 525-
40(1993).
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Americans also recognize injuries that previously were invisible, thus altering
the balance between order and autonomy.
In short, law can perform educational and symbolic functions, playing a
formative and causal role in the reform and evolution of social norms and
moral commitments. Etzioni thus unreasonably requires the law to be in lock-
step with cultural change. 69 By overemphasizing voluntary moral dialogue and
underemphasizing legal change, Etzioni gives short shrift to an important, de-
monstrable role for the American legal system.
What, then, are the roles of law and morality in reconciling order and
autonomy when opposed moral norms clash in application to a particular situa-
tion? Both values of social order or community and those of autonomy are of-
ten in place in our pluralistic society. Their general formulations may not con-
flict, but a collision may occur in application to a particular dilemma, such as
gun control or school desegregation. How does law play a constructive, recon-
ciling role of mediating norms in such situations, when the culture has not yet
achieved a conciliation?
The arguments contained in this Review lead to the conclusion that legal
decisions help to harmonize and prioritize values in a fashion that has cultural
currency and influence. Once a court decides a novel legal issue that also has a
corresponding moral dimension, and the media disseminate the result, the pub-
lic can begin to debate and consider the court's solution, incorporating it into
general cultural discourse. The legal framing of the relevant issues gives them
a salience and focus they might not otherwise have. Issues that are joined are
then potentially more susceptible of resolution, even if powerful groups within
the culture hold diametrically opposed values. And if the public vehemently
disagrees with the outcome, the decision can foment further political, social, or
legal action that could render a different result. In the absence of a judicial
resolution, and sometimes even in the face of a court's decision, power dis-
parities that overlook the rights of the less powerful are more likely to deter-
mine an outcome, with the most powerful groups prevailing.70 Thus, any the-
ory addressing the appropriate balance between order and autonomy in the
United States must take account of the affirmative and supplemental role law
can play in its development.
IV. THREE CASE STUDIES:
THE COURTS' ROLE IN BALANCING AUTONOMY AND THE COMMON GOOD
This section presents case studies applying my thesis to three controversial
issues that have overlapping moral, political, and legal dimensions: alcohol and
the responsibility of social hosts for guests' drunk driving accidents; the re-
69. See NEW GOLDEN RULE, supra note 10, at 146.
70. See generally BELL, supra note 62; see also Yamamoto, supra note 62, at 846-47.
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sponsibility of tobacco companies for damages caused by smoking-related ill-
nesses; and the responsibility of the firearms industry for the foreseeable inju-
ries that criminals cause when using guns illegally. Etzioni's methodology is
used to examine the opposed autonomy and public-good strands of justification
in each case. The applications illustrate the cogency of Etzioni's theory and its
efficacy in revealing the fault lines of fundamental social dilemmas.
Next, the alcohol, tobacco, and firearms examples are used to demonstrate
that law can play an active and sometimes even a leading role in effectuating
social change. By framing and defining the opposed individual and collective
interests in a controversial normative debate, the legal process can overcome
cultural inertia and jumpstart a process culminating in productive communi-
tarian change. It has done so in all three of the case studies. The legal process
can thus instigate change without necessarily following the lead of civil soci-
ety. For significant, permanent change to occur, the culture must adopt the
changes, as Etzioni observes. But he relegates the law to a lesser role than it
can effectively take.
The relevant legal questions in each case study coalesce around the central
issue of assigning responsibility to individuals or entities that did not directly
and immediately cause the harm asserted. When drunk drivers directly cause
accidents, smokers contribute to their own illnesses, and criminals fire guns il-
legally, should these intervening causes break the chain of liability? Identifying
the embedded autonomy and common good interests can reveal many of the
underlying concerns that should drive policy and legal analysis. Imposing li-
ability on those who are not the immediate cause of the harm could diminish
overall personal autonomy; to the extent that our society shifts responsibility
from individuals to external, attenuated causes, it could proportionally diminish
the individual liberty that accompanies personal responsibility.7' More gener-
ally, imposition of liability on manufacturers, distributors, or dealers can dis-
courage production and drive up the cost of consumer goods, arguably further
diminishing individual economic freedom.
Notwithstanding the possibility of some diminution of personal freedom,
greater public interests require a broader weighing of the costs and benefits of
imposing liability in these instances. Because an individual's ostensibly private
choice to serve alcohol to guests who drink and drive, to sell cigarettes, or to
make and sell guns tends to have foreseeable social ramifications, those conse-
quences should not be disregarded when deciding these fundamental public
policy questions. The public and society as a whole frequently end up bearing
the burden of the consequences of these dangerous activities.
The public interest in preserving health and safety is extremely strong. The
71. Thus, smokers should bear their own costs, and drunk drivers cannot blame social hosts for
their own drunk driving.
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pain and suffering involved are immense. Moreover, individual smokers and
their families frequently are unable to reimburse the government's costs of
providing medical care or lost tax revenues. Even more starkly, criminals are
likely to be judgment-proof, especially after conviction, and therefore it is
highly unlikely many criminals could reimburse a municipality for its costs re-
lated to criminal misuse of firearms. A cost/benefit calculation that counts costs
beyond the circle of immediate players reveals the inadequacy of a narrow cal-
culation. Accounting for the broader ripple effects brings a larger perspective
to bear on the legitimacy of making purveyors liable. Of course, individual
autonomy, protected by legal rights, must also be preserved. But its preserva-
tion cannot be at the expense of the social good.
The case studies elaborated below illustrate how courts and litigators have
employed some of these public policy concerns to adjust traditional standards
of causation. Historically, Anglo-American tort law has refused to hold makers
and suppliers of products such as alcohol, tobacco, and firearms liable for
harms that were caused directly by an individual's decision to use the prod-
uct.72 A strong countervailing policy interest in providing incentives to makers
and suppliers to monitor the sale and use of their products, however, can
prompt courts to reach contrary results.
A. Alcohol and Social Host Liability: Kelly v. Gwinnell
This section examines a major judicial decision imposing a duty to rescue
or protect potential victims of another's actions, focusing specifically on a so-
cial host's liability for allowing a drunken guest to drive when the guest then
causes an accident injuring a third party. The relevant legal issue is whether the
host, after serving liquor to the guest, has a duty to protect the public from the
drunk driver by refusing to allow the guest to drive. I argue that this decision is
a good representative example of constructive judicial decisionmaking that can
assist the process of beneficial communitarian social change.
Generally speaking, there is no American common law or constitutional
duty to rescue or protect another.73 The narrow band of exceptions includes
situations in which one has legally caused the harm, or in which one has a
specified, individual relationship with the victim or perpetrator that invokes a
duty of care. 74 Our law generally has embodied highly individualistic presup-
positions regarding a potential rescuer's complete liberty to decide whether or
not to aid another, even when the victim is faced with imminent death." Some
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 440,441 (1965).
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965 and 1977) ("The fact that the actor real-
izes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself
impose upon him a duty to take such action.").
74. See id. §§ 315 (a)-(b), 321-23.
75. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375 (5th
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of the reported cases present horrendous crimes or accidents causing acute suf-
fering, but hold that even defendants who easily could have rescued a victim
had no legal duty to do so, despite knowledge of the harmful event and the
ability to prevent it.
76
But because of the tension between individual rights and the common good
of requiring at least easy rescue efforts, a few courts have reached further in
creating exceptions, basing them not on "special" relationships or creation of
danger, but rather on a victim's detrimental reliance on the defendant's ac-
tions, 77 a defendant's commission of the slightest affirmative act that exacer-
bated an existing harm,78 and even mere foreseeability by the defendant. 79 So-
cial host liability for those providing alcohol to guests who drive falls into the
latter two categories.
Some of the judicial opinions imposing a new or broader duty in these cir-
cumstances struggle mightily with the tension between allowing individual de-
fendants the liberty to decide whether or not to protect a victim and the obvious
common good in promoting at least easy rescue efforts. In many cases, the
precedents are sufficiently indeterminate to call forth the underlying policy
questions and to foreclose easy decision. The wiser of the decisions provide
guidance to possible reconciliations of diametrically opposed values in our
culture.
For instance, in Kelly v. Gwinnell80 the New Jersey Supreme Court became
the first to impose liability judicially on a social host "who serves liquor to an
adult social guest, knowing both that the guest is intoxicated and will thereafter
be operating a motor vehicle[. The host] is liable for injuries inflicted on a third
party as a result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the adult guest
when such negligence is caused by the intoxication." 81
No statute or common law principle imposed this duty. Rather, the Court
considered the foreseeability of the drunken guest causing an accident and con-
cluded that New Jersey public policy favored creation of a duty of reasonable
care in these cases.8 2 Weighing the "fairness" of imposing this new duty in-
volved consideration of "the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk,
and the public interest in the proposed solution."8 3 The Court balanced the con-
ed. 1984) (concluding that "the law has persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral obligation
of common humanity to go to the aid of another human being who is in danger[.]").
76. See, e.g., Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959); Handiboe v. McCarthy, 151 S.E.2d 905
(Ga. App. 1966).
77. See, e.g., Marsalis v. La Salle, 94 So. 2d 120 (La. App. 1957).
78. See, e.g., Parvi v. City of Kingston 362 N.E.2d 960 (N.Y. 1977).
79. See, e.g., Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976).
80. 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984).
81. Id. at 1224.
82. See id. at 1222.
83. Id. (quoting Goldberg v. Hous. Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (N.J. 1962)).
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flicting interests involved to determine the outcome. 84 Chief Justice Wilentz
declared that the balance of interests favored imposition of liability on the so-
cial host. First, the social goal of reducing drunk driving was an extremely
weighty one, in light of the undisputed evidence of the causal role alcohol
played in highway fatalities.85 Second, that goal, being "practically unani-
mously accepted by society[,]" was strong enough to constitute a social norm.
86
Opposing considerations included "the belief.., that when people get to-
gether for a friendly drink or more, the social relationships should not be in-
truded upon by possibilities of litigation[,] ' 87 as well as the notion that drunk
driving is the fault of the driver, not the host.88 Despite the social hosts' inter-
ests in protecting the privacy of their home and personal relationships, and de-
spite the corresponding notion of guests' own responsibility for their condition
and actions, the court held that the balance favored imposition of a duty of rea-
sonable care:
The policy considerations served by [the] imposition [of the duty] far
outweigh those asserted in opposition. While we recognize the concern
that our ruling will interfere with accepted standards of social behavior;
will intrude on and somewhat diminish the enjoyment, relaxation, and
camaraderie that accompany social gatherings at which alcohol is
served; and that such gatherings and social relationships are not simply
tangential benefits of a civilized society but are regarded by many as
important, we believe that the added assurance of just compensation to
the victims of drunken driving as well as the added deterrent effect of
the rule on such driving outweigh the importance of those other val-
89
ues.
Substantively, the result in this case exemplifies exactly the sort of com-
munitarian balance the New Golden Rule could produce in operation. 90 Argua-
bly, this decision also comports with Etzioni's four criteria in The Limits of
Privacy. First, the privacy and autonomy of social hosts can only be interfered
with because the threat of harm is so serious. Second, alternative measures that
do not restrict autonomy have failed. Third, the court left open a means for
further restrictions on liability beyond that the host must have served alcohol to
the driver and knowingly allowed the guest to drive (rendering the decision
minimally intrusive). Fourth, undesirable side effects are minimized by re-
stricting liability. The means of achieving this result, however-litigation-is
84. See id. (citing Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (1980)).
85. See id. at 1222.
86. Id. This particular means of reducing drunk driving did not necessarily have the status of a so-
cial norm, however.
87. Id. at 1223.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 1224.
90. Cf NEW GOLDEN RULE, supra note 10, at 150 (citing Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and
Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet Responsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 649 (1995)).
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not endorsed by Etzioni.
The court decided that the individual interest in privacy and the right to
choose private behavior with friends and guests is outweighed by a responsi-
bility to the general public, that is, to the common good. Undoubtedly the nor-
mative status of drunk driving helped tip the balance. Although before the ac-
cident the harm is uncertain (that is, no identifiable victim of the driver exists),
and although the host does not cause the harm directly, creation of a duty is
nonetheless appropriate. The social order maintained by erecting all viable bar-
riers to drunk driving supports the court's conclusion. While the driver herself
is still directly liable to the accident's victims, the Kelly decision brought new
potential defendants into the picture as an additional zone of responsibility.
The threat of liability can present a significant deterrent to drunk driving,
as it creates an incentive to monitor guests' drinking, or at least to reduce the
risk of their driving drunk. The decision also places an additional moral stigma
on hosts who violate the new rule. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Kelly
thus achieved its own reconciliation of the competing values of minimizing
drunk driving and protecting the privacy of personal relationships. 91
The balancing test the court employed may be the most reasonable method
to resolve normative conflict if consensus cannot be reached. It is a utilitarian
approach to resolving conflict in that the stronger interests, judged with refer-
ence to the social good, prevail. While individuals' negative liberty carries
great weight, it is not dispositive when measured against the potential harm of
allowing drunk drivers on the road. The test is accordingly consistent with
Mill's general principle of supporting the overall human good. The result is
92also consistent with his harm principle. Coercion may be exercised to prevent
harm to another-in this case, potential victims of the drunk driver. Moreover,
a failure to prevent harm may make the driver as culpable as his actively caus-
ing harm.
The Kelly decision to hold social hosts responsible in defined circum-
stances is not one society necessarily would have or could have reached absent
legal intervention. Despite the strong public sentiment against drunk driving,
the equally strong opinion supporting individual privacy and the right of asso-
ciation creates a stalemate. While a strong social movement opposing drunk
91. The New Jersey legislature later limited the holding by statute. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-
5.5-5.8 (West 1999) (defining the scope of social host liability and creating an exclusive remedy). Under
the statutory three-part test, (1) The host must have wilfully and knowingly served alcohol to either: (a)
a visibly intoxicated guest who was in the presence of the host, or (b) a visibly intoxicated guest with
reckless disregard to the safety of others; (2) The host must have served alcohol to a visibly intoxicated
guest creating a foreseeable risk of harm to others and failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent such
foreseeable harm from occurring; and (3) The damages caused to the third party must have resulted from
the inebriated guest's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. See Greg K. Vitali, Note, An In-Depth
Analysis of the Development and Ramifications of New Jersey's Social Host Liability Statute, 20 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 532, 556 (1996).
92. See supra note 32.
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driving-headed most prominently by Mothers Against Drunk Driving-
existed at the time of the Kelly decision,93 the freedom of social hosts also taps
into the American individualist values of protecting personal privacy and the
right of association. This standoff generates a gridlock whose resolution
requires an external impetus. The Kelly decision provided that impetus.
That the legislature later clarified and limited the court's holding does not
defeat, but rather supports, this conclusion. 94 Courts do not act alone in pro-
ducing change, but in tandem with social and political forces. In this instance,
the court initiated the process of change and the legislature later engaged in a
broader dialogue that modified the initial result. Perhaps the Kelly decision is
therefore more important as a term in a larger dialectic than for the court's own
internal balancing process.
Notwithstanding the court's ability to achieve an appropriate balance be-
tween order and autonomy, Etzioni argues that coercion prohibits the effective
application of law to promote a communitarian society. Instead, he proposes
relying on voluntary compliance, facilitated and accelerated by means of broad
moral dialogues. While the social norm of opposition to drunk driving sup-
ported the court's decision in Kelly, it could not achieve the result alone, given
the opposing norms of personal privacy embedded in American law. The court
thus reached a result that exceeded a current normative stasis, rather than
merely expressing or enforcing it. In effect, the court engaged in a dialectical
process that operated much as a megalogue would. Etzioni therefore would not
endorse the court's activist result in Kelly. In fact, Etzioni expressly mentions
normative conflict with respect to drunk driving to illustrate law's assertedly
ancillary role. He refers to conflicting public attitudes about the moral impro-
priety of drunk driving and ambivalence about sobriety checkpoints, conclud-
ing that the latter, appropriately, are not widely employed because there is in-
sufficient normative support for their use. While the balance may shift in the
future as the anti-drunk driving movement gains ground, he asserts that the cur-
rent situation correctly reflects the social balance.
95
The argument of this Review, however, has been that the law sometimes
can appropriately propel a society into accepting positive communitarian
change, and that its coercive power can be useful to accomplish that objective.
Coercion that exceeds currently held normative commitments may be appro-
priate when the society is unlikely to achieve the result independently, or to
achieve indeed any coherent result, because of normative conflict or similar
93. See Joey Kennedy, Drunk Driving Makes a Comeback, REDBOOK, May, 1997, at 89 ( "[T]he
anti-drunk-driving campaign-begun by MADD in 1980 and joined by legislators, the law enforcement
community, and other public safety groups-can look back on notable successes. Public awareness of
the issue has dramatically improved.")
94. See supra note 91.
95. See NEW GOLDEN RULE, supra note 10, at 147.
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impediments. In that case, the law performs the function of mediating or har-
96monizing conflicting norms. The result can then have the salutary effect of
educating the public to accept the new reconciliation. This activist role for
courts need not be unlimited. In order to ensure that a decision will be accepted
and followed, there should already be some normative backing for the result.
Indeed, courts that attempt to forge new norms that the general community is
not ready to accept sadly may see the intended results backfire. Some of the
more controversial desegregation cases failed to produce hoped-for results be-
cause of this phenomenon.
97
This limited role for legal coercion does not undermine the corollary of the
New Golden Rule that requires a society to accept and uphold citizens' auton-
omy as it would have citizens uphold its moral order. Autonomy is not better
upheld by leaving to individual discretion the decision whether or not to allow
drunk guests to drive.98 Because freedom has a positive component as well as a
negative one, protecting the positive (as well as negative) liberty of potential
victims of the drunk driver better promotes overall autonomy than inhibiting
the negative liberty of the social host. To prevent harm, individuals sometimes
must be coerced into protective action. That is what the Kelly decision accom-
plishes. In this instance, the unlikelihood of broad voluntary compliance and
the widely shared agreement concerning the social good the decision furthers
combine to justify the result.
In the fifteen years since the decision came down, a number of states have
followed New Jersey's lead by imposing social host liability, although some
states limit liability to situations involving minors.99 Many states have also in-
creased criminal penalties for drunk driving.100 In the meantime, drunk driving
fatalities have declined significantly. 101 It is impossible to isolate the causes of
this reduction, but one can surmise that the legal changes exerted an influence,
rather than merely reflecting cultural change. Widespread efforts to promote
96. The parties before the court themselves represent conflicting moral positions. Amici curiae can
multiply the number of positions represented.
97. See generally Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions,
82 VA. L. REV. 1 1996). A more comprehensive analysis of this issue would distinguish between local,
regional, and national communities.
98. One might also ask whether the common good is better served when a democratically elected
legislature enacts social host liability, rather than a court deciding the issue.
99. See, e.g., Hickingbotham v. Burke, 662 A.2d 297, 302 (N.H. 1995) (considering the merits of
such a limitation); Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226, 230-31 (Iowa 1985) (extending liability to situa-
tions involving adults); Ashlock v. Norris, 475 N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (Ind. 1985) (recognizing civil action
in situations involving minors); see also Cravens v. Inman, 586 N.E.2d 367, 416-17 (Il1. App. 1991)
(listing states imposing social host liability for serving alcohol to minors).
100. See James B. Reed, et al., Environment, Energy, and Transportation Program, State Legisla-
tive Progress in Improving Traffic Safety, 1997, <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/esnr/transer8.htm>
(visited Feb. 17, 2000) at 15-17; Bruce Keppel, More Criticism, Less Consumption: Alcohol Under At-
tack by 'New Temperance', L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 8, 1985, at 1.
101. For example, since New Jersey enacted its social host liability statute in 1987, drunk driving
fatalities have decreased 50%. See Vitali, supra note 91, at 537.
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public recognition of the harms accompanying drunk driving probably affected
the reduction as well. The point is not that law acts alone to cause change, but
rather that it acts in conjunction with other social and political forces, fre-
quently in a secondary role, but sometimes in a leading role. It is a mistake al-
ways to relegate the law to an ancillary status out of fear of coercion. Law can
assist in the effort to harmonize conflict and can allow us to move forward in a
less halting and fragmented manner than would otherwise be achievable
through moral dialogue alone.
B. Tobacco and the Attorney Generals' Medicaid Litigation
The lawsuits recently settled by the states against the major American to-
bacco companies further illustrate the constructive role that courts can play in
achieving social change by recognizing the role of the common good in issues
previously thought to involve primarily individual rights and responsibilities.
These lawsuits were brought under a variety of legal theories, but most of the
states have sought reimbursement for Medicaid outlays to provide medical care
for victims of smoking-related diseases.1°2 Acting assertedly in "the public in-
terest," 10 3 many of the attorneys general have sought not just restitution or in-
demnification for Medicaid expenses, 1°4 but injunctive relief in the form of re-
quiring the tobacco companies, for example, to cease targeting minors in
marketing campaigns, and affirmatively to assist future public health anti-
smoking efforts.'
05
In most cases, these lawsuits were settled early in the litigation process.'
6
The settlements, however, came on the heels of other recent legal victories
against the tobacco companies, and in the wake of evidence uncovered in prior
suits concerning the tobacco industry's suppression of evidence of nicotine's
addictiveness. 10 7 Additional evidence indicated that the industry may actually
102. See David A. Hyman, Tobacco Litigation's Third-Wave: Has Justice Gone Up In Smoke?, 2 J.
OF HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 34, 36 (1998). The Justice Department recently filed a similar lawsuit.
See supra note 4.
103. See, e.g., Complaint, State of New Jersey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 1 2, 17 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div., Middlesex County, Sept. 9, 1996), available at <http://stic.neu.edu/Nj/NJcomplaint.htm>
[hereinafter New Jersey Complaint].
104. See, e.g., id. 217, 223; New York v. Philip Morris, 686 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1998) (detailing allegations of New York Attorney General's complaint)
105. See Demand for Relief, New Jersey Complaint, supra note 103.
106. See The State Tobacco Information Center, Attorneys General Bringing the Tobacco Industry
to Justice: State Suit Summary, <http://stic.neu.edu/summary.htm> (visited Feb. 21, 2000).
107. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play's Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud and Con-
sumer Choice in "Third Wave" Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 465, 474 (1998). Cupp notes:
[A] feature common to all of the [attorneys general and other recent] tobacco lawsuits is their
reliance on new evidence of tobacco industry misconduct not available to previous plaintiffs.
In the mid-1990s, plaintiffs' lawyers obtained documents indicating that the tobacco industry
knew nicotine is addictive at the same time it was representing to consumers that nicotine is
not addictive. Evidence has also surfaced that tobacco companies may have manipulated nico-
tine levels in cigarettes to enhance consumers' addiction.
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have manipulated nicotine levels to encourage addiction,' and decided not to
develop a lower-nicotine, healthier cigarette for fear it would implicate existing
brands of cigarettes as unhealthy. 0 9 The final, and in some ways most perni-
cious, indictment of the industry arose from evidence clearly indicating that
young people were targeted as potential smokers." 10
It is likely that the evidence of industry suppression of the emerging evi-
dence of the addictive properties of nicotine played a large role"' in inducing
the early settlements for such a significant amount of money. 112 This recent
evidence has influenced public perception of tobacco companies and contrib-
uted in turn to a growing social norm of opposition to smoking and "Big To-
bacco." 113 The public interest in a reduction of smoking and its attendant dis-
eases is evident. The developing new norm is increasingly to consider the
common good, rather than focus exclusively on individual fault. Prior lawsuits
almost always resulted in defense verdicts because factfmders concluded that
plaintiff smokers assumed the risk of contracting a smoking-related disease
when they chose to smoke.1 4 Particularly given the warning labels on all ciga-
rette packs and the growing body of independent evidence of the link between
Id. (footnote omitted).
108. See id.
109. See Daniel Givelber, Cigarette Law, 73 IND. L.J. 867, 891 (1998). Gevilber writes:
[C]igarette manufacturers [were effectively immunized] from liability under a negligence re-
gime as long as there was neither a claim that manufacturers continued to have superior
knowledge about the properties of cigarettes which they exploited in their marketing, nor a
claim that less lethal cigarettes could be produced and marketed. In fact, cigarette companies
did have additional information about cigarettes-particularly relating to the addictive nature
of nicotine-and they did work on developing cigarettes which promised to be less lethal than
brands on the market. The attorneys general's complaints assert, with considerable documen-
tary support, that the companies acted in a manner designed to ensure that neither consumers
nor regulators would be in a position to demonstrate that this was so.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
110. See Transcript of the Florida Tobacco Litigation Symposium-Fact, Law, Policy, and Signifi-
cance, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 737, 787-89 (1998).
111. In 1996, a Florida jury awarded $750,000 to a smoker suing a tobacco company after con-
tracting a smoking-related disease. See Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., No. 95-00934CA
(Fla. Cir. Ct., Duval County, Aug. 9, 1996). Jurors "indicated that they based their judgment largely on
cigarette manufacturer[s'] misconduct in lying about tobacco's addictiveness." Cupp, supra note 107, at
466. This verdict contrasts sharply with the vast majority of prior verdicts for defendants in tobacco
cases. The evidence of tobacco company misrepresentation had not yet surfaced when those cases went
to trial. See id. at 489-90.
112. Notwithstanding the injunctive relief agreed upon, numerous commentators found the settle-
ment disappointing, as its package of relief was much less extensive than that contained in the settle-
ment proposal that Congress defeated in 1997. See, e.g., Torry & Schwartz, supra note 4, at A7.
113. See Cupp, supra note 107, at 490, 500 (citing polls); Erin Myers, Note, The Manipulation of
Public Opinion by the Tobacco Industry: Past, Present, and Future, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 79,
93 (1998).
114. E.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965); see Adam Levy,
Announced to Trounced: A Journalist's Comments on the Demise of the Tobacco Settlement, 2 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 1, 3-4 (1998) ("In four decades of tobacco litigation, no plaintiff collected
damages from any of the tobacco industry giants based on health problems resulting from tobacco prod-
ucts.").
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smoking and disease, many if not most Americans have held smokers respon-
sible for their own conduct.' 15 This traditional focus on individual responsibil-
ity may well have blinded people to the broader causal forces contributing to
smoking, as well as to the severe associated social consequences. 11
6
Evidence of industry misconduct, however, has undermined both the tradi-
tional social norm and the assumption of risk defense in a number of ways.
First, it makes the defendants too blameworthy and generally not credible.
Second, the misconduct concerned misrepresentation of industry knowledge of
nicotine's addictive qualities. If cigarettes are actually addictive, the argument
that smokers assumed the risk of contracting illness is considerably weakened.
It is further weakened if the industry concealed knowledge of addictiveness
from the public, specifically from those considering whether or not to begin
smoking. Finally, industry targeting of young people destroys any remaining
vestige of the assumption of risk defense and places significant responsibility
for smoking and its consequences on the industry as a whole.
More generally, the attorneys general's lawsuits have circumvented as-
sumption of risk and broadened the culture's outlook by adopting the perspec-
tive of the public as a whole. That is, the financial consequences of smoking-
related disease frequently are borne by the entire community in the form of in-
creased taxes or insurance premiums. 17 Because the states, rather than indi-
viduals, have sought reimbursement of costs associated with smoking-related
disease, no question of voluntariness arises. Rather, the issues are whether the
tobacco companies were unjustly enriched or whether the public was defrauded
by industry deception. Are the harms too attenuated to attribute to an industry
at one remove from the smoker whose illness occasioned the medical costs?
Should the foreseeability of the harm make any difference? The issues have
been reframed to raise broad public policy questions, rather than examine indi-
viduals' personal decisions under a microscope.
Given that the emerging weight of public opinion is less willing to place
the onus solely on individuals, and more willing to attribute some culpability to
the industry, trials in these cases easily could have resulted in large verdicts for
the plaintiff states. It would have been the juries' responsibility to hold the
115. See Cupp, supra note 107, at 500.
116. Rephrasing the dichotomy between individual and corporate responsibility for disease in terms
of the tension between autonomy and the common good, one could argue that holding smokers, rather
than tobacco companies, responsible for their own choices best upholds individual freedom, as long as
the individuals retain some real freedom to decide. (The strength of this argument, however, correlates
inversely with the addictiveness of cigarettes.) Noninterference with the ability to purchase consumer
items such as cigarettes on the market may preserve the purest and most absolute form of individual
liberty. Conversely, however, overall autonomy, assessed in a utilitarian fashion, could converge with
the common good and be best served when those who may have manipulated nicotine levels and public
knowledge of nicotine's addictive properties are held responsible for the foreseeable results.
117. Of course, the public's concern with the costs of treating smoking-related diseases does not
mean the public is unanimous in its opposition to smoking generally. Once again, the culture as a whole
is ambivalent about the appropriate direction to take to mitigate the dangers of smoking.
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megalogue that decided the issue. The decision as to which party bears primary
culpability is not one that necessarily should be kept out of the courts until the
society as a whole has made an independent decision. Jurors' decisions are,
rather, an important part of the process of societal norm-setting. Their opinions
are influenced by existing norms, but, in a sort of symbiotic process, they in
turn further influence shifting norms, particularly when verdicts are widely
publicized.
The courts have played a further role in changing attitudes toward smoking.
Although the attorneys general's suits settled rather than proceeding to trial,
the courts in each state have had to approve the settlements and enter orders
dismissing the cases.' These courts accordingly have clarified the issues and
the significance of the settlements by issuing opinions amplifying the underly-
ing reasons. 1 9 Additionally, while the growing public sentiment attributing at
least partial responsibility for smoking-related injuries to the tobacco compa-
nies exists independent of the current spate of litigation, knowledge of the mis-
deeds of the industry likely would not have surfaced absent discovery in previ-
ous lawsuits. 120 To that extent, the public interest is served by utilizing the
discovery function of the courts to uncover misdeeds of which the public
should be aware.
The publicity and media coverage associated with every aspect of the law-
suits, from filing of the complaints to settlement, have further contributed to
positive communitarian change. With widespread media coverage, the public
has been saturated with litigation-related stories of industry manipulations that
contributed to the incidence of smoking-related disease.' 21 And the notion of
the public interest has figured prominently. The courts have adverted fre-
quently to the public interest in approving the settlements. 122 The attorneys
general have also emphasized their role as acting in the public interest.1
23
Recasting the public debate according to the tension between individual
and societal interests is a strongly positive development. It frames the debate to
allow airing of the full range of social consequences of destructive private be-
haviors, and it brings to the surface the underlying questions of proper attribu-
118. This function is much narrower than that of a court fully deciding the viability of a novel legal
claim, as in Kelly v. Gwinnell, which means that the reviewing courts ordinarily could not engage in as
full a weighing of the underlying opposed norms.
119. See New York v. Philip Morris, 686 N.Y.S.2d 564, 566-67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
120. See generally Cupp, supra note 107.
121. See Lynn Mather, Theorizing About Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and Tobacco Liti-
gation, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 897, 924 (1998) ("In the case of tobacco litigation, government and
plaintiffs' lawyers seemed to be succeeding in constructing a public to oppose the long-standing politi-
cal strength of the tobacco industry.").
122. See, e.g., New York v. Philip Morris, 686 N.Y.S.2d at 568, 573; Settlement Agreement and
Stipulation for Entry of Consent Judgment, Minnesota v. Philip Morris, No. CI-94-8565 (Minn. D. Ct.,
Ramsey County, May 8, 1998) (on file with Yale Law & Policy Review).
123. See, e.g., New Jersey Complaint, supra note 103, at 2, 17.
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tion of responsibility in the aggregate. One therefore need not agree with the
outcome to agree that promotion of a public dialogue about the role of the
common good in the cigarette debate is constructive.
It would also be difficult to argue, either normatively or descriptively, that
the role of the law in promoting this social debate about smoking is merely an-
cillary to that of civil society. Rather, this example demonstrates that courts
and litigators have taken an aggressive role in the overall effort to effect a re-
duction in smoking-related disease. Litigation has accomplished this in part by
unearthing evidence of tobacco industry misdeeds, galvanizing opposition to
the industry and its manipulation of the public. While Etzioni's method of bal-
ancing autonomy and the common good provides a highly useful tool to inves-
tigate social problems, his account of the limited role of law fails to assess fully
the complex interactions between American cultural attitudes and high-profile
litigation.
C. The Municipal Firearms Suits and Hamilton v. Accu-Tek
The lawsuits recently filed by twenty-six municipalities against leading
firearms manufacturers, distributors, and dealers echo in many ways the state
lawsuits against the tobacco companies. Not surprisingly, therefore, the order
and autonomy interests to be balanced in this context also resemble those in the
tobacco context, with similar ramifications and significance. This section ex-
amines the claims in the suit filed by the City of Chicago, as well as the recent
jury verdict for a plaintiff gunshot victim against gun manufacturers, the first
such verdict in a case not involving a particular defective gun. 124 This exami-
nation demonstrates once again, contrary to Etzioni's assertions, that courts are
and should be centrally involved in the process of public dialogue that assists
positive communitarian change.
Historically, manufacturers have not been held liable for gunshot injuries.
Guns generally function as intended; that is, they are made to cause injury,
which defeats any product liability claims. 125 Product liability and negligence
claims have also failed because it is criminals, not gun manufacturers or dis-
tributors, who illegally shoot the plaintiffs. 26 As with the assumption of risk
defense in cigarette cases, the notion of supervening cause has prohibited im-
position of legal responsibility.127 Absent evidence of an individual defendant's
124. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Hamilton v. Accu-
Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1314 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); David Kairys, Legal Claims of Cities Against the
Manufacturers of Handguns, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 12 (1998).
125. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 155 (2d Cir. 1997).
126. See, e.g., Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 775 (D.N.M. 1987). One exception exists
where a dealer sells a gun or ammunition to an obviously unstable buyer, who then shoots the plaintiff.
See Coker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 642 So. 2d 774, 778 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 1994).
127. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. The normative corollary is the general social
reluctance to impose responsibility on those whose role apparently has been only secondary.
Vol. 18:3 51, 2000
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
specific intervention in illegal harms, courts 12 have been reluctant to attribute
actions of criminals to gun makers or purveyors. 129 In addition, our cultural en-
chantment with guns and the mystique of firepower (ostensibly to protect one's
home and family) ensures vigorous resistance to anything potentially threaten-
ing to individual gun ownership. 130 Until recently, the approach of the courts
has been highly individualistic, focusing almost exclusively on the interests
and actions of individual participants. The legal system has not considered the
issues from a common good or public interest perspective; nor, much of the
time, have legislatures.
As in the tobacco cases, the municipal firearms suits and the recent deci-
sion for a plaintiff in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek 131 have shifted the focus from di-
rect, individual actions to the overall actions of an entire industry and the mar-
ket in which it operates. The plaintiffs in Hamilton-an injured survivor, his
mother, and relatives of six people killed by handguns-sued twenty-five
handgun manufacturers for negligence in 1995. They alleged "that the manu-
facturers' indiscriminate marketing and distribution practices generated an un-
derground market in handguns, providing youths and violent criminals like the
shooters in these cases with easy access to the instruments they have used with
lethal effect."' 132 In January, 1999, the case was tried to a jury, which found
fifteen of the defendants to have marketed or distributed guns negligently, with
proximate cause found for the injuries of three plaintiffs.133 Damages, however,
and therefore liability, were awarded only in favor of the injured, surviving
plaintiff and his mother against three defendants, in the amount of
$4,000,000."' Assisted by the jury instructions, the jury essentially weighed
the conflicting order and autonomy interests involved. 135 Because the gun that
seriously wounded the prevailing plaintiff was never found, damages were ap-
portioned according to each defendant's share of the national handgun market.
While market share liability is itself controversial, 136 the real novelty of the
case was the legal theory that a negligently functioning firearms market caused
the plaintiffs' injuries. Normally, a duty of care is not imposed on defendants
in these cases, but in Hamilton, the court "recognized a duty of care in connec-
128. In an unusual case that reached a jury prior to Hamilton, the jury was also reluctant to impose
liability. See Timothy D. Lytton, Note, Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain Future of Negligent
Marketing Claims Against Firearms Manufacturers, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 681, 682 (1998).
129. See, e.g., First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng'g, Inc., 900 S.W.2d 202, 204-05 (Ark.
1995).
130. See Kairys, supra note 124, at 3.
131. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Roberto Suro, N.Y Jury Finds Gunmakers Neg-
ligent in Shootings, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1999, at Al.
132. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
133. See id. at811.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 848-50.
136. See City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 125 (3d Cir. 1993).
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tion with the marketing and distribution of a non-defective but highly danger-
ous product"'137 in order to "guard against the risk of its criminal misuse."
1 38
The defendants' marketing techniques and methods of sale and distribution of
handguns were held accountable for unreasonably increasing the likelihood
that criminals would obtain guns.
1 39
Ruling on post-trial motions and upholding the verdict, the court, per Judge
Weinstein, affirmed the jury's finding that an illegal gun market had caused the
plaintiffs' injuries. Appreciable evidence indicated that easy access to hand-
guns greatly increases the likelihood of gun violence.1 40 Further substantial
evidence linked criminals' guns to sales by federal firearms licensees. A large
percentage of crime weapons had been sold by federal licensees within three
years of the crime. 14 1 In addition, the rapid diversion of guns from the legiti-
mate retail market-the so-called "time to crime" rate-indicated significant
firearms trafficking. 142 The defendants, who must have been aware of the di-
version, nonetheless continued to employ production, marketing, and distribu-
tion methods that encouraged the sale of guns to criminals. For instance, manu-
facturers did not restrict gun sales from their distributors to legitimate retailers
alone.1 43 Although they were capable of stanching the flow of guns into crimi-
nals' hands, they did nothing when they could have "declin[ed] to do business
with careless or unscrupulous [federal firearms licensees], limit[ed] sales at un-
regulated gun shows, and requir[ed] that first sales of handguns to the public
take place only in fully stocked, responsibly operated stores."
144
The court weighed the public and private policy interests at stake, con-
cluding that the balance appropriately created a new duty.
Recognition of a duty on the part of handgun manufacturers...
would not be unfair-in light of the serious consequences of a failure to
do so-or inefficient. Manufacturers who market and distribute hand-
guns negligently set the stage for their criminal misuse. They place at
risk innocent persons who derive no gain from easy access to these
137. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d, at 824.
138. Id.
139. See id at 825-27.
140. See id. at 825.
141. See id. at 825-26.
142. Id. at 826. Frequently, these crime weapons are sold to sellers who falsify transaction forms or
to "straw purchasers" who in turn hand them over to criminals. Id.
143. See id. at 823; see also Kairys, supra note 124, at 4:
New studies and investigations by local and national law-enforcement agencies, coupled with
recent research and studies now generally recognized in the field of public health, establish
more concretely and convincingly than previously available evidence that the manufacturers
of handguns: (1) produce, market, and distribute substantially more handguns than they rea-
sonably expect to sell to law-abiding purchasers, saturating urban areas and consciously and
knowingly participating in the criminal handgun market; and (2) market and distribute to
lawful purchasers for purposes and in circumstances they know, but do not reveal, to be dan-
gerous to purchasers, their families, and the public at large.
144. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 826.
Vol. 18:351, 2000
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
products. Unlike users and consumers of handguns, injured bystanders
exercise no control over their exposure to risk....
To the extent manufacturers' negligent marketing or distribution
practices allow them to profit from the acquisition of handguns by
those likely to misuse them, they must be deemed to have benefitted
wrongfully at the expense of those injured or killed. Fairness mandates
restoration of the balance through the imposition of a duty to market
and distribute handguns responsibly.1
4 5
As in the tobacco cases, the litigation set up the opposed individual and com-
munity interests inherent in the issue. Examining the defendants' operations
from the perspective of the market casts the question of their legal and moral
responsibility in a new light. The common good or public interest in a reduc-
tion of violence outweighed the private interests of gun manufacturers, dis-
tributors, dealers, and owners who benefit from an uncontrolled market.
According to the court, the public interest is a strong one.' 46 Injuries to
many members of the public-the amorphous, prospectively unidentifiable
class of gunshot victims-are both clearly foreseeable and direct in that they
flow in an unbroken line from the negligently operated market. Focusing on the
broad operations of the firearms market brings into sharp relief the links be-
tween manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and criminal purchasers. Further-
more, when the market facilitates criminals' acquisition of guns, manufacturers
and purveyors are in the best position to change those market practices that
contribute to social ills. The doctrine of supervening cause was thus also over-
come: "criminal misuse of handguns by third parties was not only a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of defendants' negligent marketing and distribution
practices, it was the precise risk; failure to take reasonable steps to guard
against it is what made defendants' conduct negligent."'
' 47
The creation of this new legal duty, based in part on the strength of the
public interest, resolved this particular case, but it also helps reconfigure the
public debate to take the common good into consideration. The opinion in
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek delineated the role of the firearms market in handgun
violence, and thus reframed the debate. One could legitimately take issue with
the legal result in this case and the extension of a tort duty of care to firearms
manufacturers; because the new duty represents an expansion of the legal doc-
145. Id. New York courts had previously constructed sophisticated standards to govern determina-
tion of the existence and scope of tort duties. See id. at 822-24. These included references to the public
good and social norms. See Palka v. Servicemaster Management Servs. Corp., 634 N.E.2d 189, 193
(N.Y. 1994) (stating that the factors to balance include reasonable expectations of society generally, and
public policies affecting new channels of liability); Waters v. New York City Hous. Auth., 505 N.E.2d
922, 923-24 (N.Y. 1987) ("While moral and logical judgments are significant components of the analy-
sis, we are also bound to consider the larger social consequences of our decisions....").
146. In fact, the court explicitly recognized its protective role, postulating that expansion of the tort
law's coverage in cases such as this "is a necessary aspect of the law's role as protector of the public
against massive delicts." Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 842.
147. Id at 835.
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trine surrounding the concept of duty, it may well be reversed on appeal. One
could also contest the court's empirical conclusion that the firearms market
causes the harms of gun violence. The point, however, is not that the result is
necessarily legally or even empirically correct, but rather that courts can be
well suited to distill or reframe issues and to balance individual rights and so-
cial responsibilities. The verdict received a great deal of publicity, 148 generat-
ing a public dialogue that is likely to continue for some time. That public dia-
logue in turn can, over time, change the cultural, political, and legal landscape,
as Etzioni suggests. Unlike Etzioni, however, I maintain that this example
demonstrates how courts can help set in motion a chain of events culminating
in the sort of communitarian change that Etzioni envisions.
Meanwhile, numerous cities, beginning with New Orleans, have filed tort
suits against gun manufacturers, distributors, and dealers as well.' 49 The cities
seek damages or reimbursement of the expenses they have incurred as a result
of handgun violence. 150 These expenses include police, emergency personnel,
human services, courts, prisons, sheriffs, and the like.' 5 1 Many of the cities al-
lege that the manufacturers', distributors', and dealers' marketing practices
seek a high volume of sales and easy public access to handguns, particularly in
urban areas, without screening out criminals, and without regard for other con-
sequences.152 Thus, for example, small handguns that can easily be carried
concealed are manufactured and marketed in large quantities and shipped into
markets that supply high-crime urban areas.
53
These lawsuits resemble the attorneys general's tobacco suits in that public
entities are seeking reimbursement of expenses paid to preserve the health of
victims of the alleged unlawful practices. Just as the tobacco suits have
changed the terms of public debate on cigarettes, the gun suits can reconfigure
the public debate on the easy availability of handguns. Avoiding the doctrine of
supervening cause, the municipalities adopt, in many cases, negligent market-
ing allegations similar to those in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek. The lawsuit filed by
the City of Chicago merges negligent marketing allegations into the larger tort
of public nuisance. The City's complaint alleges that manufacturers, distribu-
148. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Verdict Against Gun Makers Is Likely To Prompt More Suits, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1999, at B1.
149. See Paul M. Barrett, Other Cities May Follow New Orleans in Antigun Suit, but Fight Will Be
Hard, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1998, at A16.
150. See id.
151. See Kairys, supra note 124, at 13.
152. Seeid. at6:
They do not limit, or require or encourage their dealers and retailers to limit, the number, pur-
pose, or frequency of handgun purchases. Nor do they take any meaningful measures to de-
termine the training, skill, or suitability of any purchaser. For example, the manufacturers en-
courage and promote purchase by the general public of very small, inexpensive, powerful, and
rapid-firing handguns for concealed carrying in public places.
153. See Kairys, supra note 124, at 6 & n.13; see also infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
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tors, and dealers have created a public nuisance by engaging in a number of
practices that ensure "the continuing availability of illegal firearms in Chi-
cago."'154 The alleged practices include "design[ing] weapons better suited for
criminal than lawful uses"' 55; "distribut[ing] ... guns so as to ensure that they
are available to persons who live in areas where guns are impermissible [such
as Chicago, which has strict gun control ordinances]"' 56; and selling guns "to
persons whom any reasonable person would understand intend to possess or
use them improperly."'
' 57
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a public nuisance as an unrea-
sonable interference with a right common to the general public' 58 The tort of
public nuisance is thus by definition focused on the public good. A particular
action may be found unreasonable if it involves a significant interference with
public health and safety, 159 if it is unlawful, 160 or if it is continuing or perma-
nent. 16 1 The public right to be free from ongoing unlawful gun violence could
bring this case into the first or third category. Sales that fail to comply with
Chicago's strict gun control ordinances conceivably could fall in the second
category. If the plaintiffs can adequately demonstrate the chain of causation
that satisfied the court in Hamilton, they might prevail. Juries could determine
that the public price of an untrammeled firearms market is unacceptable. The
cost of the market's consequences would have to be absorbed by those who
profit from it.
It is too early to predict the outcome of these lawsuits, but for purposes of
this Review, they provide yet another illustration of the proactive role that liti-
gation can play in social change that accounts for the public interest. Even
more than Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, then, these municipal lawsuits provide an in-
stitutional forum to address the consequences to the overall community of not
restraining a firearms market that is allegedly solely concerned with maximiz-
ing profits rather than balancing profit with safety and the public good. By
providing incentives to firearms manufacturers and purveyors to concern them-
selves with more than the bottom line, the lawsuits can address some of the
154. Office of the Mayor, City of Chicago, The Concept of Public Nuisance (visited Feb. 16, 2000)
<http://www.ci.chi.il.us/Mayor/Gunlndustry/SummaryGunLawSuit.html> [hereinafter The Concept of
Public Nuisance]; Complaint, City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., (I11. Cir. Ct., Ch. Div., Cook
County, 1999), available at <http://www.ci.chi.il.us/Mayor/Gunlndustry/> (visited July 16, 1999) (on
file with Yale Law & Policy Review).
155. The Concept of Public Nuisance, supra note 154.
156. Id.
157. Id. This lawsuit is of particular interest because, prior to filing, Chicago police had engaged in
an extensive sting operation that revealed widespread dealer disregard of the laws regulating handgun
purchases. For example, dealers would advise prospective purchasers on how to avoid criminal liability
for unlawful shootings. See id.
158. RESTATEMENT, supra note 72, at § 821B(l).
159. Seeid. at § 821B(2)(a).
160. See id. at § 821B(2)(b).
161. See id. at § 821B(2)(c).
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more deleterious consequences of the untrammeled operation of a free market
in guns. Although public opinion also seems to be shifting in favor of addi-
tional regulation of firearms, 162 the courts also can be instrumental in promot-
ing communitarian change. Some evidence already exists that these lawsuits
are causing firearms manufacturers to change their practices. 163 In the absence
of social homogeneity sufficient to produce a unified approach to firearms pro-
liferation, litigation can perform the salutary function of joining issues, sharp-
ening the terms of debate, and otherwise propelling the nation to come to terms
with the consequences of unregulated handgun production and distribution. Et-
zioni's focus on social processes and dialogue obscures this function.
V. CONCLUSION
Amitai Etzioni's theory of the proper interplay between social order and
individual autonomy appropriately emphasizes the need to balance the two
concepts, rather than leaving one element out of the equation or considering
either element in isolation. Contemporary American culture tends to collapse
the tension by recognizing only individual, rather than collective, interests. As
Etzioni points out, in many instances individual and public interests can be
harmonized by recognizing their mutuality. For instance, knowledge of tobacco
industry misrepresentation and manipulation benefits individuals as much as
the public. In other instances, however, promotion of individual autonomy in-
terests can undermine the public interest. Regulation of the firearms market
provides a good, albeit controversial, example. In neither case, however, would
the United States necessarily be able to reach a workable consensus by relying
solely on social processes. The country is too diverse culturally, economically,
and politically to place primary reliance on cultural dialogue. Nor can the po-
litical process always reach a legislative resolution. It often remains for the
courts, with their powers to frame, interpret, and determine issues, and to co-
erce compliance with their orders, to resolve difficult cases in which order and
autonomy interests directly conflict.
162. See supra note 146-47 and accompanying text.
163. Paul M. Barrett & Alexei Barrionuevo, Handgun Makers Recoil as Industry Shakes Out,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1999, at BI:
A group of California handgun manufacturers, whose small, inexpensive weapons police often
associate with crime, are retreating from the cheap-gun market. The little-noticed development
began several years ago and could be the first stage of a substantial shakeout in the gun busi-
ness. A wave of municipal lawsuits against the entire handgun industry appears to be acceler-
ating the restructuring.
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